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To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury
It*
Michael J. Graetzt
For several decades, total revenues raised by estate and gift taxes have
roughly equalled those raised by excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco.' Yet
no law journal has ever asked me to write on alcohol or tobacco excise
taxes. The law firms of America do not routinely have divisions devoted to
excise tax planning. We do not hear of the suffering of widows and or-
phans (or even of farmers and small businesses) because of alcohol and
tobacco taxes. Philosophers and economists do not routinely debate the
merits of such taxes. Perhaps most significantly, increases in such excise
taxes do not arouse fears that we are about to eliminate the concept of
private property in this country and embrace socialism, or even commu-
nism. The estate tax, however, evokes just such responses.
I. RECENT TRENDS IN ESTATE TAATION
A review of the most recent history of the estate tax suggests special
ironies. Just seven years ago, in 1976, after nearly thirty years of neglect,
Congress adopted a series of revisions intended to make the estate and gift
taxes apply on a more regular and uniform basis;" these reforms had been
* An earlier version of this Article was presented as "The Estate Tax-Wither or Whither?," the
Fourteenth Mortimer H. Hess Memorial Lecture before the Association of the Bar of the City New
York City on May 11, 1983. The author wishes to thank Valerie Lambiase and Barbara McDowell
for research assistance and Professor Jerry L. Mashaw for helpful comments.
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1981, at
256 (102d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
Actually, the alcohol and tobacco excise taxes together have consistently raised several billion more
dollars per year than have the estate and gift taxes. A closer comparison is between revenues from the
alcohol excise tax alone and from the estate and gift taxes; the latter exceeded the former only in 1977
($7.4 billion vs. $5.4 billion) and 1980 ($6.5 billion vs. $5.7 billion). Id.
2. See, e.g., Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Public Hearings and Panel Discussions Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 390 (1976) (statement of Edward Pender-
gast) (suggesting that forced sale of small businesses to meet estate tax burdens "encourage[s] people
to take the 'safe' route and work for some impersonal monolithic giant") [hereinafter cited as 1976
Estate and Gift Tax Hearings]; id. at 436-37 (statement of Sen. Gaylord Nelson) (quoting 121
CONg. REC. 22,683 (1975)) (asserting that existing scheme of estate taxation "undermin[es] our val-
ues and institutions" and threatens "to change the historic character of our free enterprise system from
reliance on independent, imaginative small businesses and family farms to absolute dependence on
massive corporations"); id. at 548 (statement of Rep. Bill Archer) (equating estate taxation to "the
question of the private ownership of property, whether the Government should have the power to
confiscate the earnings of a citizen").
3. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 2001-2010, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-97.
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outlined a decade earlier in the American Law Institute's Estate and Gift
Tax Project4 and elaborated in the 1969 Treasury Tax Reform Studies'
produced at the close of the Johnson Administration. In 1976, Congress
enacted a series of provisions unifying estate and gift taxes into a wealth
transfer tax with one cumulative rate schedule and one exemption level, 6
expanding the marital deduction,7 and establishing a new tax on
generation-skipping trusts.' Through that legislation, Congress endeav-
ored to produce a structurally more coherent tax-to move toward a genu-
inely progressive estate and gift tax,9 typically to be imposed once each
generation without huge tax disparities due to decedents' patterns of life-
time giving. Not all of the structural problems were solved in the 1976
legislation-for example, the gift tax continues to be imposed on a net
base exclusive of tax, while the estate tax applies identical rates to a gross
base including the tax1 0-but on the whole, the 1976 changes significantly
improved the structure of the estate and gift taxes.
In light of subsequent events, however, it requires emphasis that al-
though the 1976 changes-principally the phased-in increase in the size of
tax-exempt estates from $60,000 (or $90,000 if the lifetime gift tax exclu-
sion was fully used) to $175,62511 and the expansion of the marital de-
duction for smaller estates" 2-were predicted to lose revenue in the short
4. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION: RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND REPORTERS' STUDIES (1969).
5. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS (1969) (joint publication of
House Ways and Means Comm. & Sen. Finance Comm. 1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 TREASURY
PROPOSALS].
6. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-48 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 2001 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (imposition and rate of estate tax) and id. § 2010,
90 Stat. at 1897 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2001 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (unified credit
against estate tax); see also I.R.C. §§ 2502, 2505 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (gift tax rate and credit).
7. Id. § 2002, 90 Stat. at 1854-55 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523 (1976)); see also
I.R.C. §§ 2502, 2505 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (gift tax rate and credit).
8. Id. § 2006, 90 Stat. at 1879-90 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 2601-2603, 2611-2614,
2621-2622 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
9. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (estate and gift taxes "significantly
increase progressivity" of tax system), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3359.
The House Ways and Means Committee reported H.R. 14,844, a proposed Estate and Gift Tax
Reform Act of 1976. Although H.R. 14,844 was not considered by the full House, many provisions of
the legislation were incorporated into the conference report on the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (H.R.
10,612). 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3356.
10. Compare I.R.C. § 2001(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1981) (taxable estate includes estate tax) with id. §§
2501-2503 (value of taxable gifts excludes gift tax). Significantly greater rates are required to produce
equivalent revenues on a tax-exclusive base than a tax-inclusive base. For example, a tax-inclusive
rate of 40% is equivalent to a tax-exclusive rate of 67%, 50% is equivalent to 100%, and 75% is
equivalent to 300%. For a discussion of tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive rates and tax bases, see INSTI-
TUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION 28 (1978) (the
"Meade Report").
11. H.R. CON. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 607, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4118, 4246-47.
12. Id. at 609, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4248.
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run, they were to have no effect on revenue over the longer run. 3 The
drop in estate tax revenues in the short term from the increased exemption
level and marital deduction was, in the long term, to be offset by addition-
al revenues from the new tax on generation-skipping trusts and by appli-
cation of the carryover-basis rules applicable to appreciated property
transferred at death. 4 In fact, the enactment of the carryover basis was an
explicit trade-off for the support of the estate tax revisions by crucial
Democrats on the House Ways and Means Committee.15
The 1976 revisions, of course, were not free of problems. The Senate
added the estate and gift tax and carryover-basis provisions to the 1976
Tax Reform Act"' without the technical refinement that normally occurs
when tax legislation moves through the Congress in the more typical man-
ner-initial consideration in the House followed by public hearings in the
Senate.1 7 The complexities and technical difficulties that haunted the
carryover-basis provision from the outset prompted a delay in its effective
date in 1978 and ultimately were a major cause of its demise in the Crude
Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980.8 The generation-skipping provi-
sions have met with similar technical objections, 9 have faced similar de-
lays in effective date,2 ° and, notwithstanding the recent Treasury proposal
13. The House report noted:
The bill is expected to reduce estate tax liabilities by $15 million in fiscal year 1977, $615
million in 1978, $803 million in 1979, $982 million in 1980, and $917 million in 1981. How-
ever, in the long run (18 to 20 years), the bill is expected to increase revenues by $273 million
per annum.
H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3356, 3357. For final estimates, see H.R. CON. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 626, reprinted
in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4118, 4264.
14. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3356, 3360-61.
15. Estate and Gift Tax Carryover Basis and Generation-Skipping Trust Provisions and Deduct-
ibility of Foreign Convention Expenses: Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1977) (statement of Rep. Abner Mikva) ("[W]e sold the increase in exemption
on this [carryover basis] tradeoff."). See Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1976, at 3, col. 1.
16. H.R. CON. REP. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 525, 607, 611-13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4118, 4225, 4246, 4250-52.
17. The Senate version of the Tax Reform Act, including the gift and estate tax revisions, was
adopted on August 6, 1976. 34 CONG. Q. 2201 (1976). The conference report modified the Senate
version by inclusion of some of the provisions of H.R. 14,844, a gift and estate tax bill that had been
reported by the Ways and Means Committee but had not been voted upon by the full House. The
conference report was adopted by both houses on Sept. 16, 1976. Id. at 2499.
18. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1520, 1872 (carryover basis
for certain property acquired from a decedent after Dec. 31, 1979), deferred by Revenue Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat. 2763, 2884, repealed by Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stat. 229, 299; see Practitioner Community Writes Congress on
Carryover, 6 TAx NOTES 502, 502-05 (1978); Hoffman, Drive to Repeal Carryover Basis Goes Into
High Gear, 9 TAX NOTES 211, 211-13 (1979).
19. Generation-Skipping Tax Assailed by Practitioner Groups, 13 TAx NOTES 1143, 1143-44
(1981) (reporting on hearings of Sen. Finance Subcomm. on Estate and Gift Taxation).
20. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 428, 95 Stat. 172, 319.
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for overhaul and simplification,21 may face a similar demise in the not-
too-distant future. Nevertheless, in 1976 Congress enacted major struc-
tural revisions to the taxation of gifts and bequests in an effort to have
these taxes apply in a more even-handed way, without reducing the total
level of deathtime taxation.
Having moved toward a basically sound and well-structured wealth
transfer tax system, Congress then reversed direction a few years later and
moved to emasculate it. In 1980, Congress repealed the carryover-basis
rules22 and returned to the unfair and economically distorting step-up of
basis to fair market value at death."3 The tax-writing committees did not
even consider enacting an income tax on appreciated assets transferred at
death or the quite simple and fair proposal for an additional estate tax on
appreciation, which had been developed in the 1970's by the Trust Divi-
sion of the American Bankers Association." ' Then, in 1981, Congress en-
acted an additional increase in the wealth transfer tax credit to produce
immediately a tax-exempt level of $275,625,"5 and phased in further
credit increases to produce an exemption for all estates with net worth of
$600,000 or less. 26 At the same time, Congress extended an unlimited
marital deduction to all estates regardless of size,2 reduced the top rate of
estate tax-applicable only to estates with net worth of ten million dollars
or more-from seventy to fifty percent,2 s and increased from $3000 to
$10,000 the amount which can annually be transferred to any donee free
of gift tax." These changes reduce the deathtime tax base by about sev-
enty percent and reduce the long-term revenue from taxing bequests to at
most one-third of that which would have been collected if the 1976 struc-
ture had remained unchanged.30
When the 1981 changes are fully phased in, the amount of appreciated
21. See 19 TAx NorES 551 (1983). For the attitude of the bar, see Bar Groups Urge Prompt
Repeal of Generation-Skipping Tax, 20 TAX NOTES 103 (1983).
22. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stat. 229, 299.
23. See 1969 TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 5, at 28-29; Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings
Before the House Commn. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3977 (1969) (statement of Jerome
Kurtz); Graetz, Taxation of Unrealized Gains at Death-An Evaluation of the Current Proposals,
59 VA. L. REv. 830, 832-38 (1973); Kurtz & Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969
Treasury Proposals, the Criticisms and a Rebuttal, 70 CoLum. L. REV. 1365, 1381-84 (1970).
24. For a description of the additional estate tax on appreciation, see Covey, Possible Changes in
the Basis Rule for Property Transferred by Gift at Death, 50 TAXES 831 (1972).
25. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 401(a), 95 Stat. 172, 299 (codified
at I.R.C. § 2010(a) (Supp. V 1981)); [2 Estate & Gift] FEDERAL TAXES (P-H) 1120,041, at 120,041
(1981).
26. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, § 401(a)(2)(A), 95 Stat. 172, 299 (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 2010(b) (Supp. V 1981)).
27. Id. § 403(a)(1), 95 Stat. at 301 (codified at I.R.C. § 2056 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
28. Id. § 402(a)-(c), 95 Stat. at 300 (codified at I.R.C. § 2001(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. V 1981)).
29. Id. § 441(a)(3)(b), 95 Stat. at 319 (codified at I.R.C. § 2503(b) (Supp. V 1981)).
30. Revenue losses are projected in H.R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 291, reprinted in
1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 105, 379.
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property transferable at death without being subject to either income or
estate taxes will have been increased ten-fold since 1976, from $60,000 to
$600,000. With such an exemption level, no more than $3 billion of the
more than $20 billion of unrealized appreciation annually passing
through estates (at 1979 levels), or only fifteen percent, will be subject to
estate tax.3 1 The other eighty-five percent will escape both income and
estate taxation.
In 1975, the $60,000 estate tax exemption (which had been in effect
since 1942) meant that only the wealthiest 6.5 percent of decedents paid
estate tax.32 If the $60,000 exemption had remained unchanged, the estate
tax would have applied to about the wealthiest ten percent of decedents in
1982.'3 The 1976 Act's increase to a $175,000 exemption level34 meant
that in 1981 the estate tax applied only to the wealthiest three percent of
persons dying that year.3 5 The immediate additional $100,000 increase, to
a $275,000 exemption level, provided by the 1981 Act 6 resulted in only
the top one percent of 1982 decedents being subject to estate tax, 7 and the
further phased-in increase to a $600,000 level will exempt all but a small
fraction of the wealthiest one percent of decedents from the tax.3 9
In summary, the 1976 legislation, which produced a more rational,
more neutral, and fairer tax on gifts and bequests with no long-term re-
duction in revenues, was followed only five years later by legislation
which made the tax all but disappear-not only in terms of the number
and percentage of decedents affected, but also in terms of its contribution
to federal revenues.
II. RECENT GENERAL TRENDS IN FEDERAL TAXATION
The schizophrenic attitude of Congress toward the estate tax, mani-
fested by the contrast between the 1976 and 1981 legislation, reflects a
fundamental tension in the tax system that has dominated tax policy de-
31. Gutman, Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes after ERTA: An Assessment 69 VA. L. REv. 1183,
1193 (1983); see infra pp. 271.
32. In 1972, the wealthiest 121,000 decedents filed returns, IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME-1972
ESTATE TAX RErTURNs 5, 31 (1974), although there were 1.9 million decedents, 1981 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 71.
33. Telephone interview with Thomas Vasquez, Deputy Director, Revenue Estimating Staff, Of-
rice of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Treasury (Apr. 15, 1983) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter
cited as Vasquez interview].
34. See supra note 11.
35. Gutman, Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 35
NAT'L TAX J. 253, 253 (1982).
36. See supra note 25.
37. Vasquez interview, supra note 33.
38. Gutman, supra note 31, at 1207. Gutman notes that "ERTA also significantly lowers the
effective rates of the transfer tax for all economic estate sizes." Id. at 1208 (emphasis in original). The
effective rate of taxation declined from 6.3% to zero for economic estates of $250,000 to $500,000 and
from 17.9% to 13.7% for economic estates of $5 to $10 million. See id.
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bates during recent years. Broadly speaking, the tension is one between a
desire for structural tax reform, which would move the tax system to-
wards greater horizontal and vertical equity, and a desire for tax provi-
sions designed to stimulate increased savings or capital formation. This
tension produces a direct conflict between the need to tax capital or the
income from capital in order to achieve a progressive tax burden and the
perceived need to exempt capital and capital income from tax in order to
induce economic growth.
Comparing the tax system in 1969 with the current situation provides a
useful perspective. Any such selection for an historical comparison is, of
course, arbitrary,"9 and my reasons for picking 1969 are not only arbi-
trary but also idiosyncratic. The comparison is an interesting one, how-
ever, because both the tax system itself and the political context for tax
revision were quite different then.
It is best to begin with politics. Joseph Barr, the Secretary of the Trea-
sury for fourteen days at the close of the Johnson Administration, an-
nounced that in 1966, 155 taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of
$200,000 or more had paid no income tax.4 This announcement in Janu-
ary 1969 generated an extraordinary number of letters from the public to
members of Congress urging tax reform.' In 1969, most people prepared
their own tax returns, and there was no such thing as a national tax shel-
ter industry. Political leadership on tax matters resided in the House
Ways and Means Committee-principally in the persons of its Chairman,
Wilbur Mills, and its ranking Republican, John Byrnes, who forged
"consensus" on tax revisions. Committee votes simply were not taken.'2
Decisions were made in relative privacy. Committee mark-up sessions
were closed, not only to the public but also to individual members' staffs.
43
Virtually all of the staff work on tax matters for both the House Ways
and Means and Senate Finance Committees was performed by the staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation. 44 Amendments were generally not per-
mitted on the House floor.45 The Ways and Means Committee bill typi-
cally became the House bill.46 There were lobbyists, to be sure, but they
39. That historical comparisons are both arbitrary and subject to manipulation to sustain a variety
of positions is amply demonstrated in Bittker, Federal Estate Tax Reform: Exemptions and Rates, 57
A.B.A. J. 236, 237 (1971).
40. Treasury Chief Warns of Taxpayer Revolt, Cites $50 Billion a Year in Preferences, Wall St.
J., Jan. 20, 1969, at 4, col. 3.
41. E. GRISWOLD & M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 77 (1976); see Congress, Trea-
sury Face Mounting Gripes from Tax Reform Advocates, Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
42. See Graetz, Reflections on the Tax Legislative Process: Prelude to Reform, 58 VA. L. REV.
1389, 1396 (1972).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1408-09.
45. Id. at 1397 & n.28.
46. Id. at 1435.
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were barred from the deliberations of the House, Senate, and Conference
Committees. A "PAC" was six beers.
Turning to economics, perhaps most significant is that 1969 was the
last year that the federal budget was balanced.4 The tiny surplus was
accomplished with the help of a few gimmicks like accelerating withhold-
ing deposits.4 s But the budget was balanced. Revenues totaled $188 bil-
lion, principally from individual and corporate income taxes and employ-





Sector (in billions) Total Revenue
Individual Income Taxes $ 87.0 46
Corporate Income Taxes 37.0 20
Employment Taxes 40.0 21
Excise Taxes 15.0 8
Estate & Gift Taxes 3.5 2
All Other Taxes 5.5 3
Total $ 188.0 100
With the exception of the extraordinary growth in employment taxes,
the pattern of revenues in that year was reasonably stable compared to the
past (although the total was, of course, growing). Compare, for example,
ten years earlier in 1959, when total revenue had been $79 billion (see
Table Two).50
47. 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 245.
48. See 35 Fed. Reg. 19,114, 19,114-15 (1970).
49. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971, at
245 (92d ed. 1972). Numbers may not total due to rounding.
50. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1105
(1976). Numbers may not total due to rounding.




Sector (in billions) Total Revenue
Individual Income Taxes $ 36.8 47
Corporate Income Taxes 17.3 22
Employment Taxes 11.7 15
Excise Taxes 10.6 13
Estate & Gift Taxes 1.3 2
All Other Taxes 1.4 2
Total $ 78.8 100
The 1983 figures in Table Three"' reflect some significant changes.
(Here I am using figures from the April 12, 1983, estimate of the Office
of Management and Budget; like the tides, the estimates for this year are
constantly changing.)
TABLE THREE
REVENUE SOURCES, 1983 (ESTIMATED)
Amount Percentage of
Sector (in billions) Total Revenue
Individual Income Taxes S 285.0 48
Corporate Income Taxes 35.0 6
Employment Taxes 210.0 35
Excise Taxes 37.0 6
Estate & Gift Taxes 6.1 1
All Other Taxes 24.9 4
Total $ 598.0 100
51. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BuDGET, BuDGr OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
FISCAL YEAR 1984, at 9-4 (1983).
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OMB projects a total of $598 billion in revenues. The deficit is esti-
mated at $208 billion52 and is expected to be well in excess of $100 billion
for many years to come.5
With regard to sources of revenues from 1969 to 1983, the individual
income tax has held relatively constant, while employment taxes have
grown most dramatically. In contrast to this substantial increase in the tax
burden borne by labor, tax sources generally believed to bear on capital
have declined significantly. The corporate income tax has declined from
an historical level of around twenty percent of total revenue to six percent
and is not estimated to exceed ten percent at any time in the foreseeable
future. Estate- and gift taxes are also down by one-half, from two percent
to one percent of total revenues.5
The politics of tax policy in 1983 are also quite different from those in
1969.55 Most importantly, power has become more diffuse. There are
many more players. Tax specialists have taken positions as minority and
majority staff to the tax-writing committees,58 diminishing somewhat the
influence of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. That Commit-
tee, which had only three persons serve as Chief of Staff in its first fifty
years from 1926 to 1976, has had three different staff chiefs since 1977.57
Power has shifted away from the House Ways and Means Committee to
both the House and Senate Budget Committees and to the Senate Finance
Committee. Committee deliberations are now open to the public and are
well attended by representatives of those groups with a special interest in
the outcome. 8 Political Action Committees ("PAC's"), with enormous in-
fluence over the direction of campaign funding, seem to have become simi-
larly influential in guiding policy decisions.5
52. Id. at 9-55. The Congressional Budget Office has more recently projected the deficit to be
$190 billion. Deficits of $190 Billion Projected, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1983, at Dl, col. 3.
53. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BuDET, supra note 51, at 9-55.
54. Id. at 9-4.
55. Gutman details the political maneuvering behind the ERTA tax revisions in gift and estate
taxation. He emphasizes the crucial role played in both 1976 and 1981 by the farm and small busi-
ness lobbies and their congressional supporters, the competition between the Reagan administration
and the House Democratic leadership to "sweeten" their respective tax packages by transfer-tax con-
cessions to "boll weevils" and other swing-vote legislators, and the failure of proponents of the revi-
sions to justify their proposals in terms of the underlying reasons for estate and gift taxation or the
perceived deficiencies of the pre-ERTA tax scheme. See Gutman, supra note 31, at 1197-1206.
56. Reese, The Politics of Tax Reform, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 248, 248-50 (1979); Panel Discussion
on the Tax Legislative Process, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 270, 273 (1979) (remarks of Edwin Cohen).
57. Telephone interview with Mike Cook, Chief Clerk, Joint Comm. on Taxation (Oct. 21, 1983)
(notes on file with author).
58. See Halperin, Do Open Sessions Promote Tax Reform?, 13 TAX NoTEs 3 (1981) (arguing
public better served by old system of private meetings); see also Graetz, supra note 42, at 1430 (argu-
ing against open sessions).
59. E. DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION 38-52, 92-93, 152
(1983) (references to tax legislation).
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Moreover, the public's attitudes towards taxation, quite positive in
1969, have become negative in a variety of ways. A national tax-shelter
industry-often operating without adequate basis in either law or
fact-has blossomed like a hundred roses.6" Not counting revenues lost
from "abusive tax shelters," there is now a "compliance gap" of approxi-
mately $75-$100 billion of taxes due but not reported."' Apparently many
high-income taxpayers now participate in tax shelters, while many mid-
dle-income taxpayers achieve their tax reductions by cash transactions and
tax fraud. Virtually no one prepares his or her own tax return anymore.
The public no longer urges that the tax system be made more fair. Jimmy
Carter's favorite target, the deduction for business meals, which he labeled
the "three-martini lunch," evoked a response only from the nation's res-
taurants and restaurant employees.6" A massive letter-writing cam-
paign-one of the largest in the nation's history-recently urged repeal of
witholding on dividends and interest, 3 but this deluge was apparently
stimulated by the banking and thrift industries.6 Public-opinion polls in-
variably reflect a public taste for a fairer tax system, but if that taste
reflects concern other than a lowering of each individual's own taxes, it
seems politically impotent.
This 1969-1983 comparison suggests several trends. First, the dominant
economic factor influencing tax policy today is the projection of very large
current and future deficits.65 If spending is-as seems to be the case-not
likely to be reduced further in substantial amounts, the deficit can be nar-
rowed only by additional revenues. Economic recovery may partially close
the revenue gap, but, as state and local governments are learning, in-
creased and new taxes will undoubtedly prove necessary. 6 This need for
revenues, however, is constrained by great reluctance, by both this Admin-
istration and important members of Congress, to increase the tax burden
on capital or capital income for fear of stifling economic growth.67 In con-
60. See, e.g., Gyps, Busts and Squirrels Plague the IRS, Washington Post, Apr. 15, 1982, at A-
23, col. 3 (noting increase in evasion, avoidance, delinquency, and abusive sheltering of taxes); 'Abu-
sive' Tax-Shelter Plants Cost the U.S. $3 Billion Annually, IRS Chief Estimates, Wall St. J., Sept. 29,
1982, at 2, col. 3 (discussing increased marketing of abusive tax shelters).
61. See Gyps, Busts and Squirrels Plague the IRS, Washington Post, Apr. 15, 1982, at A-23, col.
3. In addition, the federal government is owed over $5.5 billion in delinquent taxes. Id.
62. See Don't Tax You, Don't Tax Me. . ., Washington Post, Mar. 24, 1978, at B-7, col. 1.
63. See Senate Backers of Interest Withholding Accept Compromise That Could Kill Bill, Wall St.
J., Apr. 20, 1983, at 2, col. 3.
64. Id.
65. See supra p. 266.
66. See Manvel, Trends in State Tax Yields, 19 TAX NOTES 1004, 1004-06 (1983).
67. See generally President's Remarks to AFL-CIO National Legislative Conference, 18 W vKLY
CoMp. PRES. Doc. 444, 449 (Apr. 5, 1982) (observing, in urging opposition to elimination of third
year of tax cut, that higher taxes reduce savings and work incentives, and hence produce weaker
economy); Bradley Would Set Top Tax Rate at 30 Percent, 19 TAx NOTES 1008 (1983) (reprint of
press release from Sen. Bradley stating that his "Fair Tax Act" would eliminate "loopholes" to lower
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trast, fairness in the distribution of the tax burden seems of little political
significance since it currently enjoys no meaningful constituency.
III. THE ROLE OF THE ESTATE TAX
These conditions combine to make the estate tax a very minor player
indeed. Since it is a tax on savings, proposals to increase the estate tax run
headlong into concerns over "capital formation." Moreover, the estate tax
has very limited potential as a source of federal revenues. Although the
estate tax accounted for nearly eleven percent of federal revenues at its
zenith in 1936,"8 estate and gift taxes have never produced more than two
and one-half percent of total revenue since the end of the Second World
War.6" Even if the most recent trends were reversed by returning to the
pre-1976 tax-exempt level of $60,000 instead of proceeding with the
phased-in increases to a $600,000 tax-exempt level, estate taxes would
only be double their current total and would again produce only about
two percent of total revenue.70 If the estate tax were increased still further
to produce a post-war high of two and one-half percent of total revenue, it
would generate only an additional $8 billion, an amount which would
make only a very small dent in the projected federal deficits.
71
The limitation on potential estate tax revenues is an inherent one, not
merely a product of political obstacles. Decedents annually transfer a total
of about $120 billion in net assets.7 2 An average effective tax rate of
twenty percent would produce total revenues of about $24 billion, approx-
imately three times the current level. With any substantial exemption,
plus exclusions for certain amounts of property passing to surviving
spouses or charities, a higher average effective rate seems unrealistic. The
inherent limitation on bequests as a source of revenue cannot be overcome
by even a dramatic structural revision of estate and gift taxes, such as
converting to an inheritance or accessions tax, or taxing gifts and bequests
as income to the recipient (or, in a consumption tax world, as consump-
tax rates to "encourag[e] the work and investment that we need for long-term economic growth").
68. Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223, 239 (1956), re-
printed in READINGS IN DEATH AND GIFT TAX REFORM 3, 19 (G. Goldstein ed. 1971).
69. 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 256; 1961 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra
note 50, at 372.
70. Vasquez interview, supra note 33.
71. In 1981, total federal revenue was $606.8 billion. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATSTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1982-83, at 254 (103d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982-
83 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. Thus, 2.5 percent of total federal tax revenue was approximately $15.2
billion. In 1981, estate and gift taxes generated only $6.9 billion in revenue. Id. In comparison, a one
percentage point increase in the federal income tax rate would raise more revenue than does the
present estate and gift tax. See Gutman, supra note 31, at 1189 n.10.
72. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 502 (3d
ed. 1980).
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tion of the donor). A tax on deathtime transfers of wealth will thus not
serve as a major source of federal revenues.
So we must look elsewhere than the production of revenues if we are to
justify strengthening, rather than eliminating, the estate tax. That place
should be its role in the distribution of the tax burden, in particular, its
role in providing an important element of progressivity in the federal tax
system.
Other than the dramatic increases in total revenues, the most striking
characteristic of changes in the federal revenue sources described above is
the diminishing relative significance of progressive tax sources. Viewed as
a system of purchasing retirement and disability insurance from the gov-
ernment, the huge rise in employment taxes reflects a dramatic increase in
taxes grounded in notions of "benefit" rather than "ability to pay." By
contrast, if current employment taxes are considered to be taxes on the
current generation of workers to fund the current retirement benefits of
predecessor generations, rather than insurance purchased by current
workers-a view that may well reflect the views of current workers-a far
greater share of federal tax is imposed on labor income than in the past.
In addition, employment tax ceilings on taxable labor income exempt a
portion of the wages of highly salaried individuals.7 3 The employment tax
increases,7 4 in combination with recent cutbacks in the top rates of indi-
vidual income taxes7" and reductions in estate78 and corporate income and
capital gains taxes,77 pose significant threats to the progressivity of federal
taxation.
Moreover, the proposals for significant long-term changes in federal
taxation that currently enjoy the greatest favor in both academic and polit-
ical circles-a flat-rate tax and a consumption tax-pose further threats
to progressivity. 78 The Treasury has estimated that a flat-rate tax would
shift approximately $32 billion of taxes from upper-income (individuals
with more than $50,000 income) to lower- and middle-income taxpay-
ers. 7  Replacing all or part of the income tax with a consumption
tax-which would probably be a value added or retail sales tax-would
exempt savings completely from the tax base and would likely increase the
73. For example, in 1983, all income in excess of $35,700 was exempt from Federal Insurance
Contribution Act [Social Security] taxes. See 47 Fed. Reg. 51,003 (1982) (announcing Social Security
contribution and benefit base for remuneration paid in 1983).
74. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 101, 91 Stat. 1509, 1510-12.
75. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176-85.
76. Id. §§ 401-403, 95 Stat. at 299-305.
77. Id. § 231, 95 Stat. at 249-50; Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 301, 92 Stat. 2763,
2820-24.
78. See Graetz, The 1982 Minimum Tax Amendmnents as a First Step in the Transition to a
"Flat-Rate" Tax, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 532-33 (1983).
79. Id. at 533 (citing testimony by John Chapoton, Ass't Treasury See'y for Tax Policy).
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burden on low- and middle-income taxpayers while reducing that on
upper-income taxpayers.80
To view the estate tax, however, as contributing an important element
of progressivity to the federal tax system requires shedding a myth which
has come to dominate its political discussion. This myth-repeated most
recently in the legislative history of the 1981 Act-is that the proper func-
tion of the estate tax (as well as its historical role) is only to "break up
large concentrations of wealth."8 " The clear implication-indeed, the
principal justification for raising the tax-exempt level of estates to
$600,000-is that no estate tax should be imposed on "smaller or
moderate-sized estates." ' In 1981, "smaller and moderate-sized estates"
meant those of the wealthiest one to six percent." If the 1976 tax-exempt
level of $60,000 had been maintained, the estate tax would now apply to
the wealthiest ten percent of decedents. 4 The narrowing of the estate tax
base that accompanies political acceptance of this myth necessarily defeats
the contribution of this tax to the progressivity of the federal tax system.
The tax becomes as narrow in its intended function as it is in its contribu-
tion to the government's revenue. A strong case can then be advanced for
its elimination altogether.
In fact, however, the estate tax has done very little to dilute the greatest
concentrations of wealth. The portion of total wealth held by the richest
one percent of wealth-holders has remained remarkably stable.8 5 They
possessed roughly one-fourth of the national wealth in every year from
1958 to 1972.8" A recent study advances a tentative estimate that their
holdings declined from one-fourth to about one-fifth of total wealth be-
tween 1972 and 1976.11 Even assuming that such a decline has actually
occurred, however, nothing suggests any significant causal role for the es-
tate tax.
Looking instead at the contribution of the estate tax to the progressivity
of the tax system reveals a quite different picture: It has had a significant
80. McLure, The Value Added Tax: Effects on Productivity and Equity, 20 TAX NOTES 971,
976 (1983) ("replacing part of [the personal or corporate income tax] with a VAT would substantially
reduce the progressivity of the tax system"); see also Goode, The Superiority of the Income Tax, in
WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDrrURE? 49, 56 (J. Pechman ed. 1980) (asserting that
expenditure tax would have to have more steeply graduated rates to achieve progressivity achieved by
income tax).
81. See S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 124, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 105, 226.
82. See id.
83. See Gutman, supra note 31, at 1193.
84. Vasquez interview, supra note 33.
85. 1976 Estate and Gift Tax Hearings, supra note 2, at 1311, 1315 (statement of James Smith).
86. Id. at 1317 (Table 3).
87. J. Smith, Trends in the Concentration of Personal Wealth in the United States (Draft Paper
for Meeting of the Int'l Assoc. for Research on Income and Wealth, Aug. 1981).
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progressive effect. In 1970, the average ratio of tax to adjusted gross in-
come on individual income tax returns was 13.7 percent.88 Those taxpay-
ers who were taxed at an average rate of at least 14 percent paid a total
tax of $43 billion. 9 If they had paid their tax at the average rate, the
government would have received only $30.5 billion." The total revenue
raised through individual income taxes in excess of the average rate was
therefore $12.5 billion. By comparison, the fiscal year 1970 estate and gift
tax collections from upper-income decedents were just under $3.7 bil-
lion. 1 Thus, the estate and gift taxes-despite their low revenue
yield-contributed nearly one-third as much to the progressivity of our
tax structure as did rates in excess of the average individual income tax
even though the estate tax imposed a smaller levy on inheritances than
would have been imposed if bequests had been taxed as ordinary income.
A similar calculation for 1972 confirms this impact. Again, the estate
and gift taxes contributed nearly one-third as much to the progressivity of
our tax structure as did progressive individual income rates.9 2 Data for
the most recent year available, however, reveal a different picture. The
average income tax rate had not changed greatly9" but the revenue raised
by the estate tax amounted to only about twelve percent of that raised by
income tax rates greater than the average 4-a far smaller contribution to
progressivity than before. With the further increases in the estate tax mar-
ital deduction and tax-exemption enacted in 1981, the relative importance
of the estate tax will decline even further. Professor Harry Gutman has
estimated that if the estate tax changes of the 1981 legislation were fully
effective in 1981, "the contribution to progressivity [of the estate tax]
would be reduced to approximately 4 percent.19 5 Whatever progressivity
88. 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 257.
89. See IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME-1970 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 180 (Table 59)
(1972). This figure was obtained by first dividing the figures in column 15 (total income tax paid) by
the figures in column 2 (adjusted gross income). (Column 15 divided by column 2 represents the
percentage of adjusted gross income paid as income tax,) The sum of the figures in column 15 for
each cohort whose tax rate exceeded 14 percent equals the amount of tax paid by persons whose tax
rate exceeded the average rate.
90. See id. This figure was obtained by summing the amounts in column 2 for those cohorts
which were taxed at an above-average rate and multiplying the total by the average tax rate.
91. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AUSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1972, at
389 (93d ed. 1972).
92. 1976 Estate and Gift Tax Hearings, supra note 2, at 1237 (statement of Michael Graetz).
93. In 1980, the percentage of adjusted gross income paid in income tax was 15.5%. 1982-83
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 71, at 255.
94. Gutman, supra note 35, at 261-62.
95. Id. at 262. Professor Gutman contends that the Graetz and Treasury methodologies do not
provide "a precise measure of the annual contribution of the transfer taxes to progressivity," id. at
262, because annual transfer-tax receipts are only "a proxy for aggregate annual individual accruals
to discharge future transfer tax liabilities," id. at 267 n.42. He suggests that progressivity would be
more accurately measured by comparing income and employment taxes paid by an individual today
with the present value of the estate tax to be paid by the same individual tomorrow.
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remains in the federal tax system will be supplied entirely by the income
tax.
Reliance on progressive income tax rates as the sole mechanism for en-
suring that this nation's tax burden is distributed in accordance with abil-
ity to pay poses a number of problems. Realized rates of return appar-
ently tend to fall as wealth increases. Thus, any tax system which relies
solely on an income tax to attain progressivity will not sufficiently tax the
underlying wealth that generated the income. 6 High income tax rates
both create marginal disincentives to productivity and stimulate legal and
illegal noncompliance.9 7 Moreover, many preference provisions that have
long been a part of the income tax exempt certain sources of income from
capital.9 8 And although the aggregate contribution of the individual in-
come tax to federal revenues has been relatively stable over time, recent
revisions of the income tax base have further tended to exclude income
from capital. Among the most significant of these were the 1978 expan-
sion of the capital gains exclusion,9" the 1980 repeal of deathtime carry-
over basis rules,10 the 1981 reductions in the top rate of tax on dividends
and interest income from seventy to fifty percent, 0 1 and increases in de-
preciation allowances and tax-free retirement accounts.1 02
The principal reason, therefore, to revise the estate tax is to rescue this
mechanism for achieving progressivity, and perhaps to rescue progressivity
itself, from both short- and long-term threats. Deciding that restoration
rather than repeal is the appropriate course requires three steps: (1) a
judgment that progressivity in taxation is just and therefore good; (2) a
view that the estate tax can and should play an important role in achiev-
ing progressivity; and (3) a conclusion that progressivity should not be
abandoned because of the adverse impact of progressive taxation in gen-
eral (and the estate tax in particular) on capital formation. I shall now
turn to an examination of these three propositions.
96. See C. Steuerle, The Relationship Between Realized Income and Wealth: Report from a Se-
lect Sample of Estates Containing Farms or Businesses 2-4, 17 (Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury, OTA Paper 50, Dec. 1982) (permission to cite obtained by author).
97. See supra note 60.
98. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 103 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (exemption of interest on state and local
bonds); id. § 617 (mining depletion allowances); id. § 1202 (capital gains deduction).
99. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 402, 92 Stat. 2763, 2867-68 (codified at I.R.C. §
1202 (Supp. V. 1981)).
100. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stat. 229, 299.
101. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176-85 (codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1981)).
102. Id. § 201, 95 Stat. at 203-19 (codified at I.R.C. § 168 (Supp. V 1981)) (accelerated cost
recovery system); id. §§ 311-312, 95 Stat. at 274-85 (codified at I.R.C. § 219 (Supp. V 1981))
(retirement savings provisions).
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IV. IN DEFENSE OF PROGRESSIVITY
I shall not attempt here a full-blown defense of progressive taxation.
Nearly thirty years ago, Walter Blum and Harry Kalven spent more than
one hundred pages demonstrating that the case for progressive taxation is
uneasy.103 But, with similar scrutiny, the case for proportional taxation
should prove at least equally uneasy, and the case for regressive taxation
is surely wrong.
10 4
All I want to do here is to call into question the analytical starting
point of virtually all of the detractors of progressive taxation. Each of
them-including Blum and Kalven-begins with the presumption that the
earnings of suppliers of both capital and labor in a market economy are
appropriate not only as a necessary concession to economic efficiency or to
making a market economy work, but also "morally" appropriate as re-
wards to the owner of capital or the laborer. This view is grounded in a
widely shared belief that returns to capital and labor reward personal
merit, industriousness, and productivity. In this view, the market rewards
the strong and the deserving and fails to reward only the lazy, weak, or
otherwise undeserving. Since income and wealth are regarded as manifes-
tations of merit, people can see little reason for taxing such income or
wealth in order to fund government spending on public goods or redistri-
bution to others. From such a starting point, it becomes necessary to
"make a case" for progressive taxation, indeed for any taxation at all, and
the debate quickly turns into a series of unconvincing "ethical-
aesthetic"'10 5 assertions about the "proper" or "fair" distributions of in-
come or wealth for society-assertions which cannot promise widespread
agreement in a heterogeneous society.
The nature of the argument is effectively predetermined by the assump-
tion that the market distribution is "ethical" or "just." A move away from
the results of the marketplace necessarily becomes "uneasy," and propo-
nents of any such move are burdened with the requirement of demonstrat-
ing that their taxation scheme is also "just."
103. W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953). Prof.
Blum, in a five-page retrospective, concluded, "In the early 1950s the case for progressive taxation
was not easy. Subsequent developments in our society have made it no less, and perhaps even more,
uneasy." Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 60 TAXES 16, 21 (1982).
104. I have advanced these arguments regarding progressive taxation elsewhere. See Graetz, Com-
mentary, in WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION AND THE INCOME TAX 45-56 (A. Leibowitz ed. 1978); see
also Sen, Just Desserts, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 4, 1982, at 3, 3-6 (Book Review) (defending egalita-
rian policies favoring wealth redistribution). It is Boris Bittker's view that "the case for progressive
taxation is 'uneasy,' but it seems no more uneasy than the case for proportionality or for preferring
one tax base over another." C. GALVIN & B. BrrrKR, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE
SHOULD IT BE? 58 (1969).
105. See H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 18-19 (1938) (characterizing such argu-
ments as "ethical-aesthetic").
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But that starting point is highly questionable. It is very difficult to jus-
tify the market's distribution as ethical. The justification for a market-
determined distribution of income and wealth must rely on economic effi-
ciency and consumer and producer sovereignty-a belief that a market
economy avoids waste and increases the standard of living even for those
with a lesser distributional share, coupled with the view that minimal gov-
ernmental interference in the market increases freedom of choice and lib-
erty generally. Some would even argue that any adjustment to the distri-
bution of the market is contrary to the basic decision to maintain a system
of private property. These concerns-for output, retention of a private
property system, and consumer and producer sovereignty-necessarily re-
quire inequality in the distribution of income and wealth, which means
that equality of result cannot be an appropriate target for governmental
policies, but they do not prohibit a redistributional policy to reduce mar-
ket-induced inequalities.
There are several reasons not to regard market distributions as inher-
ently fair or as presumptively just. First, even when the market is func-
tioning perfectly, returns to both capital and labor inputs depend upon the
demand for the product or service being produced. The rewards the mar-
ket place bestows depend on factors outside an individual's control. In a
market economy, people who supply capital or labor to industries or en-
deavors where demand for the product or service proves strong will do
very well; people who work or risk their capital in industries or endeavors
where market demand for the product or service proves weak will do
quite badly. The enormous demand by customers for Olivia Newton-John
to sing "Let's Get Physical" 10 6 has made her a very wealthy woman. If
public tastes were to improve and demand for her services were to de-
crease, her income would decline dramatically without regard to any
change in her ability or work effort. The most recent recession signifi-
cantly injured American workers in the automobile industry, because de-
mand for American automobiles was very weak. The person who made
the first hula hoop became rich while the person who made the last one
probably became poor. Barbers did better in the early 1950's than in the
late 1960's.
Second, even in a perfectly functioning market economy, most produc-
tion is based upon the joint use of different resources, typically provided
by different people. In such circumstances, it is usually impossible, as an
106. 0. NEWTON-JOHN, Physical, on PHYSICAL side 2, track 1 (1981), re-released on 2 OLIVIA'S
GREATEST HITS side 1, track 3 (1982); hear also CAPTAIN & TENILLE, Muskrat Love, on CAPTAIN
AND TENILLE'S GREATEST Hrrs side 2, track 1 (1977); B. MANILOW, I Write the Songs, on TRYIN'
To GET THE FEELING side 2, track 1 (1978).
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ethical matter, to determine which person-or even which re-
source-produces or deserves what share of the total output.
Third, some share of total market returns to capital and labor are at-
tributable to societal conditions. The existence of public institutions, in-
cluding laws and law enforcement mechanisms-criminal and corporate
codes and courts to enforce them, for example-affects returns to private
institutions and individuals. As attorneys, we have been fortunate that the
American demand for legal services has been remarkably robust. Even
where that demand was from consumer preference rather than caused by
governmental action, attorneys have not become wealthy because of the
social worth of their services. The comparatively low earnings of lawyers
in other nations cannot fairly be attributed to a failure of individual "apti-
tudes and motivations for economic achievement, °10 7 but rather are due to
particular societal conditions and protections.108 In this light, it might well
make sense to ask what portion of output and of returns to labor and
capital should be characterized as societal rather than individual creations.
Fourth, returns to capital and labor are dramatically affected by luck,
by good rather than ill fortune. Many outcomes are determined simply by
accidents of birth-being born in this country rather than in the Third
World; being born smart or good-looking, rather than stupid or ugly; be-
ing born into a family of wealth and education, rather than one of poverty
and ignorance. The empirical evidence shows that inherited wealth ac-
counts for at least half the net worth of wealthy men and for most of the
net worth of wealthy women.109 Enormous one-shot gains explain most of
the remainder of the significant wealth advantages of the truly rich.110
The huge gains enjoyed by people who owned oil in the mid-seventies
were not in any sense ethically deserved, nor are the advantages of inher-
ited wealth. Both of these sources of great wealth are typically "morally
arbitrary."
This litany is intended only to call into question the typical starting
point of people who attack the moral validity of progressive taxation, of
those who simply assume that the market distributes rewards to people
who deserve them and denies rewards to people who do not. The
problems raised here call into question the ethical justification for the dis-
tributions of income and wealth in a perfectly functioning market
economy.
107. Sen, supra note 104, at 5 (quoting P. BAUER, EQUALITY, THE THIRD WORLD AND ECo-
NOMIC DELUSION (1981)).
108. See Graetz, supra note 104, at 47.
109. J. BRITTAIN, INHERITANCE AND THE INEQUALrrY OF MATERIAL WEALTH 47-49 (1978).
110. Id. at 72.
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When the market functions imperfectly, as it always does-where the
economy is burdened by inflation or unemployment or both; where indus-
try is organized to produce monopoly benefits, perhaps through legal bar-
riers to entry; where political influence or patronage produces private ad-
vantages; where equality of opportunity is absent-even the most modest
ethical claims for the justice of a market distribution of income and wealth
are further weakened. One need not believe that the rewards of personal
dedication and integrity are nil, or that the lazy and inefficient do better
than the industrious and efficient, to conclude that little of what we own
is truly attributable to individual merit alone. All receipts are joint prod-
ucts, both individual and societal. Because individual characteristics and
social characteristics are both essential to their joint outcome, there is sim-
ply no means by which a percentage of individual and social "dessert" can
be calculated.
Thus, the justification for a market distribution must ultimately be
grounded in concerns about total output-economic efficiency rather than
ethics-and in concessions to certain liberties. Before turning to the eco-
nomic efficiency issue, let me briefly identify the liberties that I regard as
directly affected by any change in the market's distribution of income and
wealth through taxation.
Four separate liberties seem to be involved.111 The first is the liberty of
consumer sovereignty: purchasers' right to buy Olivia Newton-John's aw-
ful records if they wish. The second is the liberty of producer sovereignty:
Ms. Newton-John's right to refuse to perform her songs in light of the
amount she would be able to retain after taxes. These two are very impor-
tant liberties but they are not constrained by progressivity in taxation.
The third liberty, her liberty to keep all that is paid by the consumer to
purchase her songs, and the fourth liberty, that of her heirs to be able to
keep whatever of the consumer's payments she does not consume before
death, are not nearly so absolute. There is, I think, very little justification
for protecting the rights of her lineal descendants to enjoy an enormous
advantage over others, an advantage which in this case resulted from the
tastes of the American consumer in the 1980's. I do not know why that
liberty should be protected-and in considering estate taxation, it is, after
all, heirs' interests which are at stake. Moreover, there are also important
conflicting liberties at stake here, most significantly the liberty interests of
lineal descendants of other people to start off with a rough equality of
opportunity and of initial wealth.
Even this brief review of the liberty interests at stake reveals that mod-
111. In identifying these liberty interests as the relevant ones, I am following Scanlon, Nozick on
Rights, Liberty, and Property, 6 PHIL & PuB. AFF. 3, 7 (1976).
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ern philosophers, such as the widely read and cited Robert Nozick,113 who
argue that progressive taxation of income is the equivalent of compulsory
servitude,1 " engage in an unconvincing form of reductionism that fails to
make distinctions which most tax lawyers would regard as relevant.
The case for progressive taxation becomes far easier when one rejects
the strong presumption that the market distribution of income and wealth
is necessarily linked to fairness or freedom. This may well explain why in
1976 even the conservative William Simon, when he was Secretary of the
Treasury in the Ford Administration, could assert: "There appears to be
widespread consensus that an element of progression is desirable in the
tax structure. 1 1 4 Progressivity in taxation will not lead the United States
inexorably to become-as some would have us believe-a "provincialized
backwoods, with a decaying obsolete technology, where all privacy and
individuality will be abolished and a person might be beheaded for dem-
onstrating a modicum of intellectual or entrepreneurial independence." 1 5
There is quite a strong case to be made for the fairness of substantial and
progressive taxes on bequests, unless, of course, there is an instrumentalist
barrier to such taxes-a barrier due to the impact of such taxes on eco-
nomic production and output, a barrier resulting from an adverse impact
of such taxes on economic growth. I shall now turn to that question.
V. CAPITAL FORMATION Is NOT THE TRUMP
I want now to consider what I regard as the most important objection
to estate taxation, indeed to taxation of wealth or capital income in any
form. This, of course, is the adverse impact of such taxes on the amount of
savings and investment, that is, on capital formation.
The basic argument is quite straightforward. Our nation needs more
savings if it is to enjoy economic growth. The estate tax is levied on sav-
ings, and taxing such savings will cause people to save less. The argu-
ment, of course, implicates all progressive taxation if the marginal pro-
pensity of higher-income individuals to save exceeds that of low-income
individuals. Although the argument is sometimes expressed in terms of an
equity-efficiency tradeoff,1 taxes on capital are often analyzed only in
112. R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
113. Id. at 169-70.
114. Treas. Doc. 76-25 (Sec'y of Treasury William Simon's letter to Mrs. Llewellyn Lowe),
reprinted in TAx NOTES Dec. 27, 1976, at 11.
115. Both my research and that of the Journal have failed to uncover the source of this quotation.
I am offering a tax book to the first person who can correctly identify the source of this quotation. I
am here following the example of Boris Bittker, who once made a similar offer when he was unable to
find the source of a quotation in one of his writings. [Professor Bittker has also promised a tax book to
the first person who can identify the footnote in which his offer was made. Responses should be
directed to the offerors.-Ed.]
116. See, e.g., A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 88-120 (1975) (dis-
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terms of their effects on economic growth and efficiency.11 The case for
lower taxes on capital, however, is far from clear.
At the outset, one might question the alleged need for increased savings.
There is considerable evidence that the savings rate has not declined since
the 1930's and that there now exist large amounts of excess industrial
capacity. As a recent Federal Reserve study observed: "From the stand-
point of gross total investment as a share of total economic activity, there
is no evidence of a declining rate of U.S. capital formation." 1 " Similarly,
gross total savings and gross private savings have been essentially without
trend." 9 The data show cyclical volatility, and that, subsequent to the
enactment of the investment tax credit in 1962, there has been a shift of
business investment from structures to equipment. 2 ° Second, while efforts
to measure the contribution of capital to economic growth are controver-
sial within the economic profession, empirical findings suggest that tech-
nological advances and population growth, rather than increases in sav-
ings, have accounted for the bulk of economic growth. 1" Even the current
economic recovery seems to be led by demand-side spending rather than
supply-side saving.' 22 But let us put such questions aside and assume that
the country needs more savings. What would that imply for the estate
tax?
The estate tax is such a small revenue source that its effects on savings
and investment are no doubt dwarfed by the impact of other taxes and by
fiscal and monetary policies. Perhaps for this reason, the impact of the
estate tax on aggregate savings has not received much explicit theoretical
or empirical examination by modern economists. The modern economic
cussing equity-efficiency tradeoff in context of transfer payments to poor); Sandmo, Optimal Taxa-
tion: An Introduction to the Literature, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 37 (1976) (discussing optimal tax rates from
perspectives of income distribution, work incentives, and capital formation).
117. Current & Quotable: Ture on New Directions in Economic Policy, 17 TAX NOTES 1289,
1291; Ture, The Economic Effects of Tax Changes: A Neoclassical Analysis, in JOINT ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE, 4 SPECIAL STUDY IN ECONOMIC CHANGE: STAGFLATION-THE CAUSES, EFFECTS,
AND SOLUTIONs 316, 343-45 (1981).
118. Enzler, Conrad & Johnson, Introduction and Summary, in FED. RESERVE SYS., PUBLIC
POLICY AND CAPITAL FORMATION 1, 5 (1981); see Johnson, Capital Formation in the United States:
The Postwar Perspective, in FED. RESERVE Sys., supra, at 47, 57.
119. Enzler, Conrad & Johnson, supra note 118, at 5; see H. AARON, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
SOCIAL SECURITY 31 n.4 (1982) (noting that average net private saving rate was 7.96% from 1948 to
1964 and 8.22% from 1965 to 1980).
120. Auerbach, Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy and the Cost of Capital, 21 J. EcoN.
LITERATURE 905, 929 (1983); Enzler, Conrad & Johnson, supra note 118, at 5; Johnson, supra note
118, at 55.
121. Enzler, Conrad & Johnson, supra note 118, at 7-9, 11; Lubitz, Capital Formation and
Savings in Major Industrialized Countries, in FED. RESERVE SyS., supra note 118, at 59, 68-69.
122. Americans Saving Less Now Than Before the '81 Tax Act, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1983, at
Al, col. 2, D7, col. 1 (reporting that consumer spending jumped 9.7% in second quarter of 1983,
"accelerat[ing] the economy's recovery from the recession to a rollicksome, 9.2 percent pace").
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literature does, however, contain observations by Richard Musgrave,12
Lester Thurow,"2 and Gerard Brannon 25 that deathtime taxes on capi-
tal, such as estate taxes, are likely to have smaller disincentive effects than
lifetime income taxes.
Unfortunately, given results to date of much more extensive economic
research on related issues, I do not expect that more detailed investigation
of the estate tax by professional economists will produce unambiguous re-
sults. For example, public finance economists have devoted great attention
recently to the effects of taxation on incentives to invest, with particular
emphasis on efforts to discover the effects of corporate (and related per-
sonal) income tax rules on business investment decisions." 6 They have
observed many distortions, most notably how the deductibility of interest
has biased financing decisions and how depreciation rules have created
great differentials in effective corporate tax rates across investments. 37
Conclusions about the overall impact of corporate and personal income
taxes on business investment decisions, however, are harder to come by.
An exhaustive review of the recent economic literature offers the following
summary of the results:
[T]hough we have learned much in recent years about how taxes
might motivate the behavior of [corporate] managers, we have yet to
develop a unified theory capable of explaining fully the dividend,
leverage and investment decisions that managers make. Nor have we
been able to answer without ambiguity, questions about the empiri-
cal importance of the effects of different taxes and inflation on the
cost of capital. Creative empirical approaches and richer models of
behavior may be necessary for future insights to be gained.12 8
At a more impressionistic level, there is the revealing response of Nor-
man B. Ture, who was Undersecretary of the Treasury for Tax and Eco-
nomic Affairs and is often described as an architect of the 1981 tax legis-
lation. When confronted with the fact that personal savings declined to a
33-year low following that legislation, he replied: "It is not only a dis-
123. See R. MUSGRAVE, THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 248 (1959).
124. See L. THUROW, THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 157-58 (1971).
125. See Brannon, Death Taxes in a Structure of Progressive Taxes, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 451,
451-52 (1973).
126. For an excellent discussion of the recent literature, see Auerbach, supra note 120; see also A.
AUERBACH, THE TAXATION OF CAPITAL INCOME (1983); M. FELDSTEIN, CAPITAL TAXATION
(1983); Kopcke, The Efficiency of Traditional Investment Tax Incentives, in FED. RESERVE SYS.,
supra note 118, at 163-75.
127. See, e.g., Jorgenson & Sullivan, hIflation and Corporate Capital Recovery, in DEPRECIA-
TION, INFLATION, AND THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 171, 195-210 (C. Hulton ed.
1981); Auerbach, supra note 120, at 912-17.
128. Auerbach, supra note 120, at 936-37.
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turbing result. It's very surprising."1"' Since educated guessing is clearly
appropriate, I offer my suspicion that tax-induced distortions in specific
financing and investment decisions may have a far greater deleterious im-
pact on economic activity than any disincentive effects due simply to the
existence of corporate and personal income and estate taxation.
A second major endeavor of public finance economists in the last decade
has been to study the increasingly significant impact of Social Security
employment taxes and retirement benefits on aggregate savings. Massive
amounts of theoretical and empirical research have been completed and
"reputable economists may be found who argue that Social Security has
decreased savings, increased savings, or had no perceptible effect."' 30
Moreover, the uncertainties surrounding the Social Security debate relate
directly to the estate tax question because they center on what Henry
Aaron describes as one of "the key unresolved analytical issues in econom-
ics, the question of how long a planning horizon individuals have
.. . . M31 At the most fundamental theoretical level in the analysis of in-
dividuals' savings behavior, three models compete.' 32 Two of the theoreti-
cal models used to analyze Social Security-the more frequently used
"life-cycle hypothesis"' 3 and the "short-horizon model"' 3 4-imply that
estate taxes should have little or no effect on savings,'3 5 while the third
model-the "multigeneration model"-suggests that a heavy tax on be-
quests will substantially reduce savings." 8
Further empirical uncertainty involves whether and how savings are
affected by changes in the rate of return-the after-tax interest rate. The
question seems to be a variation on the age-old question of the relative
magnitude of the so-called income and substitution effects: To what extent
will people consume more if savings are taxed, and to what extent will
they save more to make up for losses due to the tax? For many years
129. Americans Saving Less Now Than Before the '81 Tax Act, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1983, at
Al, col. 2.
130. H. AARON, supra note 119, at 2.
131. Id. at 10.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 113.
134. Id. at 23-25.
135. The life-cycle hypothesis assumes that individuals plan to spend their entire lifetime income
while they are alive. Id. at 12. Bequests occur only because individuals guess incorrectly about their
lifespan, id.; taxes on estates or gifts do not affect their plans. The short-horizon model assumes that
because of informational constraints, individuals plan only a few years ahead, id. at 24, and thus that
they pay little attention to their estate until late in life.
136. Id. at 20-23. The multigenerational model assumes that an individual gains utility from the
consumption that others undertake because of the individual's bequest. Id. at 21. Because taxes on
bequests affect the net consumption provided to others by a given gross bequest, the individual in the
multigenerational model will change her behavior with changes in estate tax rates. See Kotlikoff &
Summers, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. POL
ECON. 706, 707 (1981).
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empirical results were conflicting, 137 but the best recent evidence seems to
suggest that savings is positively related to the real after-tax rate of inter-
est (after adjusting for inflation)." 8 This finding has, of course, provided
impetus for proposals to reduce a wide variety of taxes on capital and
income from capital, including not only the estate tax, but also taxes on
amounts saved for retirement, on capital gain, and on corporate income.13'
The overall impact of such tax reductions on capital formation, how-
ever, will tend to depend upon other factors-most notably other aspects
of fiscal and monetary policy. Monetary policies will, of course, affect the
real rate of interest and the effects of changes in such policies may well
overwhelm the impact of a tax reduction, especially a reduction in a rela-
tively minor tax imposed at an uncertain future time, such as a deathtime
tax on wealth. Moreover, the effect of any tax reduction on capital forma-
tion will vary depending upon how the additional tax revenues would
have been used. If the taxes were used to reduce the deficit-say, by pay-
ing interest on the national debt, interest which now amounts to more
than $100 billion a year 4°--the negative impact of the increased taxes on
the rate of return to savings might be partially, fully, or more than offset
by the positive effect on capital formation of reduced deficits and govern-
ment debt.
It seems that modern economics has done little to improve upon Max
West's characterization of this debate in his 1908 book on the inheritance
tax." " After noting the objections of Adam Smith and Ricardo, among
others, to inheritance taxes on the grounds that they are "taxes on capital,
and hence tend to diminish the national wealth," he characterized their
objections as "really demolished" by John Stuart Mill, whom he quoted
as stating:
The argument cannot apply to any country which has a national
debt, and devotes any portion of revenue to paying it off; since the
137. See Howrey & Hymans, The Measurement and Determination of Loanable-Funds Saving,
in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED?, supra note 80, at 9-17 (reviewing empirical studies).
138. See, e.g., Boskin, Taxation, Saving, and the Rate of Interest, 86 J. PoL. EGON. S3, S3-S27
(1978); David & Scadding, Private Savings: Ultrarationality, Aggregation and "Dennison's Law,"
82 J. POL. ECON. 225, 225-49 (1974); Taylor, Saving Out of Different Types of Income, 2 BROOK-
INGS PAPERS ON EcON. AcrtviTY 383, (1971); Wachtel, Inflation, Uncertainty, and Savings Behav-
ior Since the Mid-1950's, 4 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. RESEARCH 558 (1976).
139. See supra p. 273; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Pam-
phlet Analyzing Flat-Tax Proposals Considered at Senate Finance Committee Hearings on Sept. 28,
1982, reprinted in DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 188, at J-1 (Sept. 28, 1981); An Analysis of Flat-
Rate Taxes, 15 TAX NOTES 951 app. (1982).
140. The Treasury Department estimates that the interest on the national debt will be $128.2
billion for fiscal year 1983. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY BULLETIN: 3RD QUARTER
FISCAL 1983, at 7 (1983).
141. M. WEST, THE INHERITANCE TAX 189-234 (2d ed. 1908).
Vol. 93: 259, 1983
To Praise the Estate Tax
produce of the tax, thus applied, still remains capital, and is merely
transferred from the tax-payer to the fundholder
1 42
By the same token, if a tax on bequests replaces other taxes on capital
or capital income, the net impact on savings might well prove beneficial.
If, for example, estate tax revenues were used to reduce lifetime personal
income taxes on capital income or corporate income taxes, a tax on capital
transferred at death might well enhance, rather than retard, productivity
and economic growth.1 43 Henry Aaron recently characterized the debate
over Social Security:
Economists, who are no more immune to hunches than anyone
else, have applied the tools of their discipline to try to determine
which of these hunches [about how Social Security affects sav-
ings] is correct.
The evidence is conclusive that so far they have failed. Using
the best that economic theory and statistical techniques have to
offer, they have produced a series of studies that can be selec-
tively cited by the true believers of conflicting hunches or by peo-
ple with political agendas that they seek to advance.
. . . [T]he evidence falls grossly short of establishing the size,
or even the direction, of the effects of Social Security on capital
formation . 1...44
The evidence concerning the alleged adverse economic effects of the es-
tate tax is far less extensive but equally inconclusive. Liberal economists
will likely find little or no impact; conservative economists will probably
discover serious deleterious effects. On balance, however, the economic ev-
idence available to date simply fails to make a case for the elimination or
reduction of estate and gift taxes on the grounds that increased savings
will result. Other considerations must dominate such decisions. Persons
who wish to increase the rate of capital accumulation would likely do
better to focus on reducing federal deficits, stimulating business invest-
ment, and eliminating income tax incentives for inefficient investments.
142. Id. at 209. In a modem economics text, Richard and Peggy Musgrave make a related point:
"[W]e have seen that $1 of both tax and loan finance reduces private expenditures by $1, but that tax
finance is more likely to fall on private consumption, whereas loan finance will tend to fall on invest-
ment." R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 72, at 708. Of course, neither the Mill argument
nor the Musgraves' point addresses the contention that an estate tax will so upset incentives that
leisure will be substituted for productive activity and the private capacity to save will thereby be
diminished.
143. Auerbach has even suggested that an income tax on excess returns above a safe rate of return
may have no real economic effects. Auerbach, supra note 120, at 935.
144. H. AARON, supra note 119, at 51-52.
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VI. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR THE ESTATE TAX?
So where does the foregoing leave me? First, confirmed in my view that
progressive taxation complies with notions of fairness-that it is just and
should not now be abandoned. Second, with the belief that a tax on be-
quests-an estate tax-can and should play an important role in achiev-
ing progressivity in the federal tax system; indeed, with the conviction that
taxes on bequests are preferable to high tax rates on income as a means of
achieving progressivity. Finally, with the view that there is no convincing
evidence that the advantages of taxing bequests as a means of obtaining
progressivity in taxation are overcome by the deleterious impact of estate
taxes on capital formation. It is my view, therefore, that the nation's tax
laws should move in the direction of the 1976 legislation, not that of the
1981 law, and that the estate tax should be rejuvenated and returned to its
prior status as an important contributor to the progressivity of the tax
system. But having urged this as the direction it should go, I cannot close
without also examining where it will likely go.
There are two practical barriers to my preferred course of strengthen-
ing the role of the estate tax in the federal system. The first I have already
described-namely the inherent limitation on the revenue potential of an
estate tax. As I have detailed above, there simply is not enough wealth
transferred annually to permit a wealth transfer tax (an estate and gift
tax) to become a significant source of federal revenue. Given the current
and projected levels of federal deficits, only substantial revenue sources
seem likely to dominate the political agenda in the near-term. Thus, tax
increases grounded predominately on distributional fairness would seem to
have little chance of success.
The second practical barrier is that-for reasons which remain quite
mysterious to me-taxation of bequests is extremely unpopular politically.
The political obstacles take a variety of forms. It is often said that oppo-
nents of tax increases hide behind selected widows. Even with the unlim-
ited marital deduction, when one considers estate taxation, both widows
and orphans are readily at hand. The fact that most heirs of wealthy dece-
dents are rich adults145 has little or no political significance.
A more important political obstacle to estate taxation lies in the objec-
tions of owners of small businesses and farms. These two groups produced
the political momentum for both the 1976 and 1981 increases in the level
of tax-exempt estates, 146 and will (effectively, no doubt) resist any political
efforts to reverse that trend. Although the estate tax does pose liquidity
145. 1976 Estate and Gift Tax Hearings, supra note 2, at 1233, 1234 (statement of Michael
Graetz).
146. See Gutman, supra note 31, at 1198.
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problems for some owners of small businesses and farms, their clout far
outweighs their actual stake in general estate tax policies. 1417 The great
bulk of assets transferred at death by people subject to the estate tax has
always been composed of liquid and readily marketable assets, principally
securities.148 Nevertheless, coherent and progressive estate tax revision
seems quite unlikely unless the political obstacles posed by farmers and
owners of small businesses are neutralized.
The most puzzling political obstacle to estate tax revision, however, is
that the American people do not seem to like heavy taxes on bequests.
George McGovern's proposal in 1972149 to confiscate inheritances above a
certain amount was not well received, and a recent California initiative to
repeal the state's inheritance tax garnered a sixty-four percent positive
vote.5 0 This was a greater majority than those in favor of a nuclear freeze
or against gun registration, issues on a subsequent initiative ballot.1"" The
only convincing explanation that has occurred to me for this phenomenon
lies in the optimism of the American people. In California, at least, sixty-
four percent of the people must believe that they will be in the wealthiest
five to ten percent when they die.
The combination of these political obstacles to the estate tax's rejuvena-
tion and the tax's inherent limitations as a significant revenue source leads
me to conclude that the estate tax seems far more likely to wither than to
grow stronger. As I have suggested, this prediction makes me fear the
demise of progressive taxation in the United States. In the long term, res-
cuing progressivity may require enactment of a periodic low-rate wealth
tax, a tax that is now in place in many European nations and that enjoys
significant revenue potential and substantial economic advantages over
high marginal tax rates on the income from capital.15 ' Developing the
case for a wealth tax, however, is a subject for another article.
If my prediction (as opposed to my desire) is fulfilled, and the years
ahead complete the demise of the estate tax, the federal tax system will
have lost more than an important and useful mechanism for achieving
147. Gutman reports that only seven percent of the gross value of assets subject to transfer taxa-
tion is attributable to farmers and owners of small businesses. Id. at 1210.
148. 1976 Estate and Git Tax Hearings, supra note 2, at 1311, 1319-20 (statement of James
Smith).
149. Washington Post, Aug. 30, 1972, at A-11, col.1.
150. L.A. Times, June 10, 1982, pt. 1, at 16.
151. L.A. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, pt. 1, at 16.
152. The European countries with wealth taxes as of 1976 were Austria, Denmark, Finland,
West Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Dobson, An Analysis
of European Wealth Taxes, 30 BULL. INT'L FISCAL Doc. 231 (1976), reprinted in S. SURREY, W.
WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 1140 (1977);
see also Cooper, Taking Wealth Taxation Seriously, 34 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 24 (1979). But see
Verbit, Taking Wealth Taxation Seriously, 60 B.U.L. REV. 1, 14 (1980) (describing European wealth
taxes as "in decline").
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progressivity; it will have lost a source of great humor. No longer will we
hear the laughter of students or colleagues when we relate stories of the
advantages of tax-savings gifts knowingly made in contemplation of death,
or of antics such as those of Mrs. Stowe, who won her contemplation-of-
death case because at age eighty, no doubt on the advice of her lawyer, she
proved her life-related motives by dancing the night away at the St. Regis
Hotel. 153 In fact, just the other day, I heard today's version of thoughtful
estate planning advice in the office of a well-known New York practi-
tioner. A client had asked with great anxiety what he might do to mini-
mize the estate taxes of his ninety-year-old widowed mother who had a
large fortune, composed of extremely valuable art and cash. The lawyer
thought for a great long while, no doubt running through his bag of estate
planning tricks, when all of a sudden, with a gleam in his eye, he looked
up and said calmly, "Marry her."'1 54 It would be a real shame if a tax
which produces such creative advice were to disappear.
153. Estate of Stowe, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 432 (1972).
154. The advice came from T.A. Kurz, Debevoise & Plimpton. See S. NAIFEH & G. SMITH, THE
BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA 88 (1983). A truly prudent attorney would have said, "Find a state in
which you can marry her."
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